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Opportunistic Jamming for Enhancing Security: Stochastic Geometry
Modeling and Analysis
Chao Wang and Hui-Ming Wang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This correspondence studies the secrecy commu-
nication of the single-input single-output multi-eavesdropper
(SISOME) channel with multiple single-antenna jammers, where
the jammers and eavesdroppers are distributed according to the
independent two-dimensional homogeneous Poisson point process
(PPP). For enhancing the physical layer security, we propose
an opportunistic multiple jammer selection scheme, where the
jammers whose channel gains to the legitimate receiver less than
a threshold, are selected to transmit independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian jamming signals to confound the
eavesdroppers. We characterize the secrecy throughput achieved
by our proposed jammer selection scheme, and show that the
secrecy throughput is a quasi-concave function of the selection
threshold.
Index Terms—Secrecy communication, SISOME, Poisson point
process, jammer selection, secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial jamming scheme introduced in [1] has been rec-
ognized as an active approach for improving the physical
layer security. For improving the security of rely networks,
cooperative jamming has been introduced in [2], [3], where
multiple single-antenna jammers transmit jamming signals
collaboratively to confound the eavesdropper. In [4], a hybrid
opportunistic relaying and jamming scheme has been pro-
posed. In [5], exploring the heterogeneous large-scale fading,
a distributed jamming scheme is proposed for securing the
single-input multi-output transmission. In [6], [7], cooperative
jamming has been applied in random networks under the
framwork of stochastic geometry. A survey of the recent
advances on cooperative jamming for enhancing security can
be found in [8].
Although cooperative jamming can secure the single an-
tenna communication efficiently, for its implementation, the
beamformer weights multiplied at each jammer should be
designed coordinately, which will result in a high overhead,
especially when these jammers are spatially separated in a
random network. Besides, a common jamming signal vector
should be shared among multiple jammers in the cooperative
jamming, and the shared jamming signals should be secured
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against eavesdroppers, which would increase the design com-
plexity further. To reduce the system complexity, a fully
distributed jamming scheme without centralized design is
more preferable in a practical system. In [7], we proposed a
distributed opportunistic jammer selection scheme to secure a
single-input multiple-output (SIMO) transmission, where each
cooperation node takes its channel direction information (CDI)
of the legitimate channel as the jammer selection criteria, and
transmits independent jamming signals.
In this correspondence, we propose an opportunistic jammer
selection scheme for securing the single-input single-output
multi-eavesdropper (SISOME) wiretap channel in a random
network, where positions of multiple jammers and eavesdrop-
pers as two independent Poisson point processes (PPPs). In
particular, multiple single-antenna jammers whose channel
gains to the legitimate receiver are less than a fixed selection
threshold, are selected to transmit i.i.d. jamming signals. We
characterize its achievable secrecy throughput and obtain the
global optimal selection threshold. Different from cooperative
jamming schemes proposed in [2], [4] which require multiple
jammers to transmit jamming signals collaboratively and share
jamming signals, our proposed opportunistic jammer selection
scheme makes it possible that multiple jammers can send
jamming signals independently and do not need to share
jamming signals. The proposed scheme is also different from
the uncoordinated one in [7] since we take the channel gain
information (CGI) of jammers into consideration rather than
the CDI, so that it can be applied for securing the SISOME
wiretap channel.
Specially, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) Under a stochastic geometry framework, an efficient
multiple jammer selection scheme is proposed for securing
the SISOME wiretap channel, where each jammer transmits
jamming signals in an uncoordinated way so that a very low
system overhead is consumed.
2) Compact analysis results of the achievable connection
outage and the secrecy outage are derived, which facilitates
the numerical evaluation of the secrecy throughput achieved
by our proposed scheme.
3) We prove that the secrecy throughput is a quasi-concave
function of the selection threshold, which can be calculated
numerically with a low complexity.
Notation: x ∼ CN (Λ,∆) denotes the circular symmetric
complex Gaussian vector with mean vector Λ and covariance
matrix∆, y ∼ exp(1) denotes the exponential random variable
with the parameter 1, ln(·) denotes the base-e logarithm
function, Γ(x) is the gamma function [9, eq. (8.310)], γ(x, y)
is the lower incomplete gamma function [9, 8.350.1], Ei(x)
is the exponential integral function [9, 8.211.1], E(·) denotes
the statistical expectation.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. System model
We consider a wiretap channel consisting of a legitimate
transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob), multiple jam-
mers, and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves). All the nodes in the
considered system are equipped with a single antenna1. For
guaranteeing security, we proposed an opportunistic multiple
jammer selection scheme, where multiple jammers are selected
in a distributed fashion to cover the secrecy transmission by
sending independent artificial jamming signals.
We consider both large-scale and small-scale fading for
wireless channels. For the large-scale fading, we adopt the
standard path loss model l(r) = r−α, where r denotes the
distance and α > 2 is the fading exponent [10]. For the small-
scale fading, just as [6], we assume independent quasi-static
Rayleigh fading, and the channel gains follow the exponential
distribution with the parameter 1. Since Eves are passive, their
instantaneous CSIs and locations are unavailable. We assume
that the locations of jammers and Eves are modeled by two in-
dependent homogeneous PPPs on R2 with the densities λJ and
λE , respectively. Such random PPP model is well motivated
by the random and unpredictable locations of eavesdroppers.
We denote the location set of all jammers, selected jammers
and eavesdroppers as ΦJ , ΦsJ and ΦE , respectively, and the
distance between Alice and Bob as d.
When multiple selected jammers are activated to transmit
jamming signals independently, the received confidential sig-
nals at Bob would be disturbed by jamming signals, and the
received signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at Bob
can be calculated as SINRB = PShBd
−α
PJ
∑
i∈Φs
J
giBD
−α
iB
+N0
, where
PS is the transmit power of Alice, PJ is the transmit power
of each jammer, hB ∼ exp(1) is the channel gains between
Alice and Bob, giB ∼ exp(1) and DiB are the channel gain
and the distance between the ith jammer and Bob, N0 is the
noise power received at Bob.
Since the noise power at Eve is typically unknown to Alice,
we adopt a conservative approach, as done in [4], [7], [6],
to design the secure transmission scheme by assuming that
the noise power at Eve is zero. In such case, the received
signal to interference ratio (SIR) at the jth eavesdropper can
be calculated as SIREj =
PShEj d
−α
Ej
PJ
∑
i∈Φs
J
giEjD
−α
iEj
, where hEj ∼
exp(1) and dEj are the channel gains and the distance between
Alice and the jth Eve, giEj ∼ exp(1) and DiEj are the channel
gain and the distance between the ith jammer and the jth Eve.
B. Opportunistic Jammer Selection
For securing the legitimate transmission, an opportunis-
tic jammer selection is performed to maximize the receiv-
ing performance difference between the legitimate receiver
and eavesdroppers. Since the locations of eavesdroppers are
unavailable, it is difficult to select the jammers according
to their locations. In this correspondence, we perform the
1Due to size, cost, or hardware limitations, in some wireless systems, e.g.,
ad hoc network and D2D communication scenarios, the nodes can not support
multiple antennas. Therefore, our proposed opportunistic jammer selection is
suitable for enhancing the physical layer security of these systems.
jammer selection only according to the channel gains giB ,
without considering the large-scale fading effects. In particular,
multiple jammers whose channel gains to Bob less than a
fixed threshold, are selected to transmit i.i.d. artificial jamming
signals. With such jammer selection scheme, the transmitted
jamming signals would confound multiple Eves while keeping
Bob as non-intrusive as possible. Then, the channel gains of
the selected jammers to Bob should be in the following set
RJ = {giB | giB ≤ δ and i ∈ ΦJ} , (1)
where δ is the selection threshold. Although a smaller δ
would result in less jamming signals received at Bob, the
number of competent jammers also decreases. Therefore, there
is a tradeoff between decreasing the harmful interference
received at Bob and increasing the power of the jamming
signals received at Eves. Therefore, δ should be optimized
to maximize the achievable secrecy performance.
With such jammer selection scheme, the channel gain giB
should lie in the set RJ and we define the probability of
giB ∈ RJ as ProbJ , which can be calculated as ProbJ =
1− exp(−δ).
Therefore, the random variable giB given giB ∈ RJ has the
conditional density function
fgiB (x|giB ∈ RJ ) =
exp(−x)1[0,δ](x)
1− exp(−δ)
, (2)
where 1[0,δ](x) is the indicator function having 1 if x ∈ [0, δ]
and 0 otherwise.
According to [10], we know that the resulting selected
jammer set is a thinning of the homogeneous PPP of the
intensity λJ with the retention probability ProbJ . Then the
resulting selected jammer set is a homogeneous PPP ΦsJ of
the intensity λsJ which is given by λsJ = (1− exp (−δ))λJ .
From λsJ , we can find that λsJ becomes smaller as δ decreases.
C. Secrecy Throughput
In this correspondence, we study the achievable secrecy
performance of our proposed opportunistic jammer selection
scheme by considering the outage based secrecy metrics.
In the following, we denote the confidential message rate
as Rs and the rate of the transmitted codeword as Rt. When
the capacity of the channel from Alice to Bob is below the
transmission rate Rt, Bob can not decode the received message
correctly. The probability of this event is defined as connection
outage probability. When the maximal capacity of the channels
from Alice to multiple Eves is above the rate Re , Rt −
Rs, the confidential information can not be perfectly secured
against eavesdropping. The probability of such event is defined
as secrecy outage probability. Under a given connection outage
probability σ and secrecy outage probability ǫ, the secrecy
throughput µ is defined as
µ , (1 − σ)Rs, (3)
which is suitable for evaluating the secrecy performance of
systems with stringent delay constraints.
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III. SECRECY THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS AND
OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we firstly study the achievable secrecy
throughput of the proposed jammer selection scheme. Then,
we prove that the achievable secrecy throughput is a quasi-
concave function of δ, and the optimal δ can be located
efficiently by many numerical methods.
A. Secrecy Throughput Analysis
Defining the SINR threshold for the connection out-
age as βB , the corresponding rate threshold is Rt =
log2 (1 + βB). The connection outage, pco is defined as pco ,
Prob (SINRB ≤ βB), whose analysis result is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1: Setting ρ = 2
α
, pco can be calculated as
pco = 1− exp
(
−
N0d
αβB
Ps
−λJπγ (ρ+ 1, δ) Γ (1− ρ)
(
dαPJ
Ps
)ρ
β
ρ
B
)
. (4)
Proof:
pco =Prob

hB ≤ βB
(
N0 + PJ
∑
i∈Φs
J
D−αiB giB
)
dα
Ps


= 1− exp
(
−
βBN0d
α
PS
)
E

exp

−dαPJβB
Ps
∑
i∈ΦsJ
DαjBgiB



 . (5)
Then, employing [10, eq. (8)], the expectation
E
(
exp
(
− d
αPJβB
Ps
∑
j∈Φs
J
DαjBgjB
))
can be calculated
as
E

exp

−dαPJβB
Ps
∑
j∈ΦsJ
DαjBgjB



 =
exp
(
−λsJπE
(
g
ρ
jB
)
Γ (1− δ)
(
dαPJβB
Ps
)ρ)
, (6)
and
E (gρiB) =
∫ δ
0
xρexp(−x)
1− exp (−δ)
dx =
γ (ρ+ 1, δ)
1− exp(−δ)
. (7)
Then substituting (7) into (6), (4) can be derived.
Assuming that the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) thresh-
old for the secrecy outage as βE , the corresponding rate
threshold is Re = log2 (1 + βE). The secrecy outage is
pso = Prob
(
max
j∈ΦE
SIREj ≥ βE
)
, (8)
whose analysis result is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: pso can be calculated as
pso = 1−
exp

− λE(
PJβE
PS
)ρ
λJ (1− exp(−δ)) Γ (1 + ρ) Γ (1− ρ)

 .
(9)
Proof: Following the probability generating functional
(PGFL) [10], we have
pso = 1− E

 ∏
j∈ΦE
(
Prob
(
SIREj ≤ βE
))
= 1− exp
(
−λE
∫
R2
(
1− Prob
(
SINREj ≤ βE
)
dxEj
))
,
(10)
where xEj denotes the location of the jth eavesdropper, and
Prob
(
SIREj ≤ βE
)
denotes the probability that the received
SIR at the jth eavesdropper is less than βE . Assuming that
the distance between the jth eavesdropper and Alice is dEj ,
Prob
(
SIREj ≤ βE
)
=
1− E
(
exp
(
−
PJd
α
Ej
∑
i∈Φs
J
giEjD
−α
iEj
PS
))
(m)
= 1−
exp
(
−λJ (1− exp(−δ)) Γ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)d2Ej
(
βEPJ
PS
)ρ)
(11)
Step (m) is due to [10, eq. (8)]. Then, substituting (11) into
(10) and changing to a polar coordinate system, we have
pso = 1− exp
(
−λEπ
∫ +∞
0
exp (−Ψy)dy
)
, (12)
where Ψ ,
(
PJβE
PS
)ρ
λJ (1− exp(−δ))πΓ(1 + ρ)Γ(1 − ρ).
After completing the integral, the proof can be completed.
Then with Theorem 2, the required rate redundancy Re for
maintaining the secrecy outage constraint pso ≤ ǫ, can be
calculated by setting pso = ǫ, which is given by
Re = log2
(
1+

 λE(
PJ
PS
)ρ
λJ (1− exp(−δ)) Γ(1 + ρ)Γ(1− ρ)ln 11−ǫ


α
2

 .
(13)
Accordingly, the maximal Rt can be calculated from the
connection outage constraint pco ≤ σ in (4). Unfortunately,
the closed-form analysis result of the maximal Rt can not be
obtained from (4). But since pco is a monotonic increasing
function of Rt, employing the bisection search, the numeral
result of the maximal Rt can be obtained. Then, according to
(3), the secrecy throughput µ can be calculated by
µ = (Rt −Re)(1− σ). (14)
In the following subsection, we would optimize the selection
threshold to maximize the achievable secrecy throughput µ.
B. Optimizing δ for Secrecy Throughput Maximization
From the discussions above, we can find that there is an
optimal tradeoff between protecting Bob from the harmful
interference and increasing the jamming power received at
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each Eve, which is determined by δ. The following theorem
shows that the achievable secrecy throughput is a quasi-
concave function of δ.
Theorem 3: µ is a quasi-concave function δ.
Proof: For maximizing µ, the maximal βB and minimal
βE should make the constraints above active, which leads to
pco = σ and pso = ǫ.
For notational conciseness, we denote b , N0d
α
PS
, a =
λJπΓ (1− ρ)
(
dαPJ
PS
)ρ
, and c , λEP
ρ
S
P
ρ
J λJΓ(1+ρ)Γ(1−ρ)
. Then,
from pco = σ and pso = ǫ, according to implicit function
theorem, we have
dβB
dδ
= −
aδρe−δβ
ρ
B
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
, (15)
dβE
dδ
= −
βEexp(−δ)
ρ (1− exp(−δ))
. (16)
Since µ = (1− σ) (Rt −Re), where only Rt − Re is deter-
mined by δ, µ is a quasi-concave function of δ, if and only if
Rt −Re is a quasi-concave function of δ.
In the following, we show that Rt−Re satisfies the second-
order conditions of the quasi-concave function [11, Section
3.4.3], which is given as follows. f(x) is a quasi-concave
function on R, if and only if df(x)
dx
= 0⇒ d
2f(x)
d2x
≤ 0.
When d(Rt−Re)
dδ
= 0, we have
aδρe−δβ
ρ
B
(1 + βB)
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)
=
βEexp(−δ)
(1 + βE) ρ (1− exp(−δ))
. (17)
Then, in the following, we prove that when δ satisfies (17),
the second-order derivative d
2(Rt−Re)
d2δ
≤ 0.
From (15) and (16), we first derive the second-order deriva-
tive of Rt−Re with respect to δ after tedious manipulations,
given by (18) at the top of this page, where
Θ = aρδρ−1βρ−1B (1 + βB) (βBb+ aργ(ρ+ 1, δ)β
ρ
B)
+ (1 + βB)
a3ργ(ρ+ 1, δ)
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
> 0.
When δ satisfies (17), T1 in (18) is zero. In the following, we
concentrate on proving that T2+T3 in (18) is positive. Before
proceeding, we bound T2 with the following procedures.
From (17), we have
1
((1 + βE) ρ (1− exp(−δ)))2
=
a2δ2ρβ
2ρ
B
β2E (1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2 .
Then with the equation above, T2 can be bounded as (19)
at the top of the next page, where step (e) holds since the
achievable secrecy throughput is nonnegative.
Then T2 + T3 can be bounded as
T2 + T3 ≥
Θ+∆1 +∆2
(1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2 , (20)
where ∆1 , a2δ2ρe−δβ2ρB − a2ρδ2ρe−δβ
2ρ
B , ∆2 ,
a2δ2ρe−δβ
2ρ−1
B − a
2ρe−δδ2ρβ
2ρ−1
B .
Since ρ < 1, we have ∆1,∆2 > 0 and T2 + T3 > 0. Then
we can conclude that when δ satisfies (17), d2(Rt−Re)
d2δ
< 0.
Therefore Rt −Re is a quasi-concave function of δ, and µ is
a quasi-concave function of δ.
Since µ is a quasi-concave function of δ, the optimal δ for
maximizing µ can be located by the bisection search algorithm
in [11]. For implementing the bisection search algorithm, we
need the first-order derivative of Rt − Re with respect to δ,
which can be derived from (15) and (16). In particular,
d (Rt −Re)
dδ
= −
aδρe−δ(βoB)
ρ
(1 + (βoB)) (b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ) (β
o
B)
ρ−1)
+
βoEexp(−δ)
(1 + βoE) ρ (1− exp(−δ))
, (21)
where βoB is the maximal βB satisfying pco = σ, and βoE
is the minimal βE satisfying pso = ǫ. The closed-form
analysis result of βoE can be derived from (9), which is given
by βoE =
(
λE(
PJ
PS
)ρ
λJ (1−exp(−δ))Γ(1+ρ)Γ(1−ρ)ln 11−ǫ
)α
2
. The nu-
merial result of βoB can be derived from (4) by numerical
methods.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Setting the distance between Alice and Bob d = 1 m, the
path loss exponent α = 3, considering different λE and λJ ,
some representative simulation results are provided to gain
more insights into the proposed jammer selection scheme. In
Fig. 1, we show the secrecy performance comparison between
our proposed opportunistic jammer selection scheme and the
random jammer selection scheme in [6], where multiple ran-
domly selected jammers transmit jamming signals indepen-
dently to interfere with eavesdroppers. Without jammer selec-
tion, the jamming signals transmitted from multiple randmly
selected jammers would deterioriate the receive performance
of Bob and Eves simultaneously. Therefore, compared with our
proposed jammer selection scheme, the secrecy performance
deterioration of the random jammer selection scheme can be
anticipated. From Fig. 1, we can find that compared with the
ramdom jammer selection scheme, the secrecy performance
improvement acheived by our proposed opportunistic jammer
selection scheme is substantial, which validates the efficiency
of our proposed secure transmission scheme.
In Fig. 2, we plot the secrecy throughput versus λJ , which
shows that the achievable secrecy throughput increases with
the increasing λJ , and there is a diminishing return in the
achievable secrecy throughput as λJ increases. This because
that although the increasing alternative jammers would in-
crease the interference power received at potential eaves-
droppers, the interference received at Bob also increases.
Furthermore, although the cost for the secrecy communication
decreases with the increasing alternative jammers, the maximal
Rt is limited by the legitimate channel. Therefore, when the
transmission power at Alice remains unchanged, the improve-
ment of the secrecy throughput by increasing λJ is limited.
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d2 (Rt −Re)
d2δ
= e−δ
(
aδρe−δβ
ρ
B
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
−
βEexp(−δ)
ρ (1− exp(−δ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
− e−δ

βEe
−δ + βEρe
−δ + β2Eρe
−δ
((1 + βE)ρ (1− e−δ))
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
Θ+ a2δ2ρe−δβ2ρB − a
2ρδ2ρe−δβ
2ρ−1
B − a
2ρδ2ρe−δβ
2ρ
B − a
2ρe−δδ2ρβ
2ρ−1
B − a
2ρe−δδ2ρβ
2ρ
B(
(1 + βB)
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
))2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3

 , (18)
T2 =
a2δ2ρe−δβ
2ρ
B + ρa
2δ2ρe−δβ
2ρ
B
βE (1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2 + a2ρδ2ρe−δβ2ρB
(1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2
(e)
≥
a2δ2ρe−δβ
2ρ−1
B + ρa
2δ2ρe−δβ
2ρ−1
B
(1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2 + a2ρδ2ρe−δβ2ρB
(1 + βB)
2
(
b+ aργ (ρ+ 1, δ)βρ−1B
)2 , (19)
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Fig. 1: Performance comparison between our scheme and random jammer
selection proposed in [6] for σ = 0.1, ǫ = 0.01, PS = 20 dBm.
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Fig. 2: Average secrecy throughput achieved by our scheme vs λJ for σ =
0.1, ǫ = 0.01, PS = 20 dBm, and PJ = 30 dBm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we proposed an opportunistic jam-
mer selection scheme for improving the security of the SI-
SOME wiretap channel where jammers whose channel gains
to Bob less than a threshold, are selected to transmit i.i.d.
jamming signals to confound eavesdroppers. We characterize
the secrecy throughput achieved by the scheme, and prove
it is a quasi-concave function of the selection threshold.
Simulation results confirm the efficiency of our proposed
secure transmission scheme.
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